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Abst rac t 
Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) is a framework for mobile code safety in which 
the code supplier provides a program together with an abstraction (or abstract 
model of the program) whose validity entails compliance with a predefined safety 
policy. The abstraction plays thus the role of safety certificate and its generation 
is carried out automatically by a fixed-point analyzer. The advantage of provid-
ing a (fixed-point) abstraction to the code consumer is that its validity is checked 
in a single pass (i.e., one iteration) of an abstract interpretation-based checker. 
A main challenge to make ACC useful in practice is to reduce the size of certifi-
cates as much as possible, while at the same time not increasing checking time. 
Intuitively, we only include in the certificate the information which the checker is 
unable to reproduce without iterating. We introduce the notion of reduced cer-
tifícate which characterizes the subset of the abstraction which a checker needs 
in order to validate (and re-construct) the full certificate in a single pass. Based 
on this notion, we show how to instrument a generic analysis algorithm with the 
necessary extensions in order to identify the information relevant to the checker. 
1 Introduction 
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [?] is a general framework for mobile code 
safety which proposes to associate safety information in the form of a cer-
tificate to programs. The certificate (or proof) is created at compile time by 
the certifier on the code supplier side, and it is packaged along with the code. 
The consumer who receives or downloads the (untrusted) code+certificate 
package can then run a checker which by an eflicient inspection of the code 
and the certificate can verify the validity of the certificate and thus com-
pliance with the safety policy. The key benefit of this "certificate-based" 
approach to mobile code safety is that the consumer's task is reduced from 
the level of proving to the level of checking, a task that should be much 
simpler, efficient, and automatic than generating the original certifícate. 
Abstraction-carrying code (ACC) [?,?] has been recently proposed as 
an enabling technology for PCC in which an abstraction (or abstract model 
of the program) plays the role of certifícate. An important feature of ACC 
is that not only the checking, but also the generation of the abstraction is 
automatically carried out by a fixed-point analyzer. In this paper, we will 
consider analyzers which construct a program analysis graph which is inter-
preted as an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of states explored by 
the concrete execution. To capture the different graph traversal strategies 
used in different fixed-point algorithms, we use the generic description of 
[?], which generalizes the algorithms used in state-of-the-art analysis en-
gines. Essentially, the certification/analysis carried out by the supplier is 
an iterative process which repeatedly traverses the analysis graph until a 
fixpoint is reached. The analysis information inferred for each cali which 
appears during the (múltiple) graph traversals is stored in the answer table 
[?]. After each iteration (or graph traversal), if the answer computed for 
a certain cali is different from the one previously stored in the answer ta-
ble, both answers are lubbed and the result is used 1) to update the table, 
and 2) to enforce recomputation of those calis whose answer depends on it. 
In the original ACC framework, the final full answer table constitutes the 
certifícate. The key idea is that, since the certifícate contains the fixpoint, 
a single pass over the analysis graph is suflicient to validate the certifícate 
in the consumer side. It should be noted that the ACC framework and our 
work here are defined at the source-level, whereas in existing PCC frame-
works the code supplier typically packages the certifícate with the object 
code rather than with the source code (both are untrusted). The reasons 
and motivations for our approach can be found in [?]. 
One of the main challenges for the practical uptake of ACC (and re-
lated methods) is to produce certificates which are reasonably small. This 
is important since the certifícate is transmitted together with the untrusted 
code and, henee, reducing its size will presumably contribute to a smaller 
transmission time -very relevant for instance under scarce (or expensive) 
network connectivity conditions. Also, this reduces the storage cost for the 
certifícate. Nevertheless, a main concern when reducing the size of the cer-
tifícate is that checking time is not increased as a consequence. In principie, 
the consumer could use an analyzer for the purpose of generating the whole 
fixpoint from scratch, which is still feasible as analysis is automatic. How-
ever, this would defeat one of the main purposes of ACC, which is to reduce 
checking time. The objective of this paper is to characterize the subset 
of the abstraction which must be sent within a certifícate and which still 
guarantees a single pass checking process. 
Fixpoint compression is being used in different contexts and tools. For 
instance, in the Astrée analyzer [?], only one abstract element by head of 
loop is kept for memory usage purposes. In the PCC scheme, the basic idea 
in order to compress a certifícate is to store only the analysis information 
which the checker is not able to reproduce by itself [?]. For instance, this 
general idea has also been deployed in lightweight bytecode verification [?] 
where the certifícate, rather than being the whole set of frame types (FT) 
associated to each program point as obtained by standard bytecode verifi-
cation [?], is reduced by omitting those (local) program points FTs which 
correspond to instructions without branching and which are lesser than the 
final FT (fixpoint). Our proposal for ACC is at the same time more gen-
eral (because of the parametricity of the ACC approach) and carries the 
reduction further because it includes only the analysis information of those 
calis in the analysis graph whose answers have been updated, including both 
branching and non branching instructions. The intuition is that, when there 
is at most one (initial) update during the computation of an entry in the an-
swer table, the part of the analysis graph associated to it has been computed 
in one traversal, i.e., its fixpoint has been reached in a single pass. Henee, 
we can safely extract such information from the certifícate and the checker 
should still be able to re-generate it in a single pass. In this work, we intro-
duce the notion of reduced certifícate which characterizes the subset of the 
abstraction which the checker needs in order to validate (and re-construct) 
the full certifícate in a single pass. Then, we show how to instrument the 
generic analysis algorithm of [?] with the necessary extensions in order to 
identify relevant information to the checker. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section 
presents a general view of ACC. Section 3 recalls the certification process 
performed by the code supplier and illustrates it through our running ex-
ample. In Section 4, we characterize the notion of reduced certifícate and in 
Section 5, we instrument a generic certifier for its generation. Finally, Sec-
tion 6 concludes and discusses the work presented in this paper and future 
work. 
2 A General View of Abstraction-Carrying Code 
We assume the reader is familiar with abstract interpretation (see [?]) and 
(Constraint) Logic Programming (C)LP (see, e.g., [?] and [?]). 
A certifier is a function certifier : Prog x ADom x AInt i—• ACert which 
for a given program P G Prog, an abstract domain Da G ADom and a 
safety policy Ia G AInt generates a certifícate Certa £ ACert, by using 
an abstract interpreter for Da, which entails that P satisfies Ia. In the 
following, we denote that Ia and Certa are specifications given as abstract 
semantic valúes of Da by using the same a. 
The basics for defining such certifiers (and their corresponding checkers) 
in ACC are summarized in the following six points: 
Approximat ion. We consider an abstract domain (Da, C) and its corre-
sponding concrete domain (2D, C), both with a complete lattice structure. 
Abstract valúes and sets of concrete valúes are related by an abstraction 
function a : 2D —• Da, and a concretization function 7 : Da —• 2D. An 
abstract valué y G Da is a safe approximation of a concrete valué x E D 
iff a; G 7(2/). The concrete and abstract domains must be related in such 
a way that the following holds [?] Va; G 2D : j(a(x)) ~3 x and \/y G 
Da '• ®(j(y)) = V- In general |Z is induced by C and a. Similarly, the 
operations of least upper bound (U) and greatest lower bound (l~l) mimic 
those of 2D in a precise sense. 
Analysis . We consider the class of fixed-point semantics in which a (mono-
tonic) semantic operator, Sp, is associated to each program P . The 
meaning of the program, [[P], is defined as the least fixed point of the Sp 
operator, i.e., [[P] = lfp(.S'p). If Sp is continuous, the least fixed point is 
the limit of an iterative process involving at most LO applications of Sp 
starting from the bottom element of the lattice. Using abstract inter-
pretation, we can usually only compute [[P]a, as [[P]a = lfp(<Sp). The 
operator Sp is the abstract counterpart of Sp. 
(1) analyzer(P,r,a) = l f p ( ^ ) = [[Pla 
Correctness of analysis ensures that [[P]a safely approximates [[P], i.e., 
Verification Condit ion. Let Certa be a safe approximation of P . If an 
abstract safety specification Ia can be proved w.r.t. Certa, then P satisfies 
the safety policy and Certa is a valid certifícate: 
(2) Certa is a valid certifícate for P w.r.t. Ia if Certa ^ Ia 
Certifier. Together, equations (1) and (2) define a certifier which provides 
program fixpoints, [[P]a, as certificates which entail a given safety policy, 
i.e., by taking Certa = [[P}a-
Checking. A checker is a function checker : Prog x ADom x ACert 1—• bool 
which for a program P G Prog, an abstract domain Da G ADom and a 
certifícate Certa G ACert, checks whether Certa is a fixpoint of Sp or 
not: 
(3) checker(P, Da, Certa) returns true iff (Sp(Certa) = Certa) 
Verification Condit ion Regenerat ion. To retain the safety guarantees, 
the consumer must regenérate a trustworthy verification condition -Equa-
tion 2- and use the incoming certifícate to test for adherence of the safety 
policy. 
(4) P is trusted iff Certa ^ Ia 
A fundamental idea in ACC is that, while analysis -equation (1)- is an 
iterative process, checking -equation (3)- is guaranteed to be done in a 
single pass over the abstraction. 
3 Generation of Certificates in ACC 
This section recalls ACC and the notion of full certificate in the context of 
(C)LP [?]. For concreteness, we build on the algorithms of CiaoPP [?]. 
3.1 The Analysis Algorithm 
Algorithm 1 has been presented in [?] as a generic description of a fixed-
point algorithm which generalizes those used in state-of-the-art analysis 
engines, such as the one in CiaoPP [?]. In order to analyze a program, 
traditional (goal dependent) abstract interpreters for (C)LP programs re-
ceive as input, in addition to the program P and the abstract domain Da, 
a set Sa G AAtom of Abstract Atoms (or cali patterns). Such cali patterns 
are pairs of the form A : CP where A is a procedure descriptor and CP 
is an abstract substitution (i.e., a condition of the run-time bindings) of A 
expressed as CP G Da. For brevity, we sometimes omit the subscript a in 
the algorithms. The analyzer of Algorithm 1 constructs an and-or graph [?] 
(or analysis graph) for Sa which is an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) 
set of (possibly infinite) and-or trees explored by the concrete execution of 
initial calis described by Sa in P. The program analysis graph is implicitly 
represented in the algorithm by means of two data structures, the answer 
table and the dependency are table. 
• The answer table contains entries of the form A : CP i—• AP where A is 
always a base form.1 Informally, its entries should be interpreted as "the 
answer pattern for calis to A satisfying precondition (or cali pattern), 
CP, accomplishes posteondition (or answer pattern), AP." 
• A dependency are is of the form H^ : GPQ =>- [CP\] Bk,i : CP2- This is 
interpreted as follows: if the rule with H^ as head is called with description 
CP0 then this causes that the i-th literal Bki to be called with description 
CP2- The remaining part GP\ is the program annotation just before B^i 
is reached and contains information about all variables in rule k. 
Intuitively, the analysis algorithm is a graph traversal algorithm which 
places entries in the answer table and dependency are table as new nodes 
and ares in the program analysis graph are encountered. To capture the 
different graph traversal strategies used in different fixed-point algorithms, 
a prioritized event queue is used. We use O G QHS to refer to a Queue 
Program rules are assumed to be normalized: only distinct variables are allowed to 
oceur as arguments to atoms. Furthermore, we require that each rule deñning a predícate 
p has identical sequence of variables xPl,... xPn in the head atom, i.e., p(xPl,... xPn). 
We cali this the base form of p. 
Algorithm 1 Generic Analyzer for Abstraction-Carrying Code 
function ANALYZE_F(5, ti) 
for A : CP € S do 
addjever\t(newcall(A : CP),ti) 
while E := next_event(fi) do 
if E := newcall(A : CP) t hen new_call_pattern(A : CP,ti) 
else if E := updated(A : CP) t hen add_dependent_rules(A : CP,ti) 
else if E := arc(R) t hen process_arc(ü, ti) 
r e tu rn answer table 
procedure NEW_CALL_PATTERN(A : CP, ti) 
for all rule Ak : -Bk¡1,...,Bk¡nk do 
CP0 :=Aextend(CP ,vars(Bky\, • • • ,Bkynk)) 
CPi := Arestnct(CP0,vars(Bkvlj) 
add_event(arc(Ak : CP =¿> [CP0] B M : CPi),íí) 
add A : CP i—> ± to answer table 
procedure PROCESS_ARC(iífc : CP0 => [CP\\ Bk¿ : CP2,ti) 
if Bk¡i is not a constraint t hen 
add Hk : CPQ =>• [CPi] Bfc ¿ : CP2 to dependency are table 
W :=vars(Ak,BkA,...,Bk,n¿); CP3 := get_answer(Bfcji : CP2,CP1,W,ti) 
if CP3 7^  ± and i ^ nk t hen 
CP4 := Arestnct(CP3,vars(Bk)i+1)); 
add_event( arc(Hk : CP0 => [CP3] Bk¡i+1 : CPA),ti) 
else if CP3 7^  ± and i = nk t hen 
APi := Arestñct(CP3,vars(Hk)); ¡nsert_answer_¡nfo(ií : CP0 >->• APi,f2) 
function GET_ANSWER(L : CP2, CPi,W,ti) 
if L is a constraint t hen r e tu rn Aadd(L, CP\) 
else AP0 := lookup_answer(L : CP2,ti); APX := Aextend(AP0,W) 
r e tu rn Aconj(CPi, AP{) 
function LOOKUP_ANSWER(A : CP, ti) 
if there exists a renaming a s.t.a(A : CP) 1—> AP in answer table t hen 
r e t u r n a~1(AP) 
else add-ever\t(newcall(a(A : CP)),ti) where a is renaming s.t. a (A) in base 
form; r e tu rn ± 
procedure INSERT_ANSWER_INFO(ÍÍ : CP i-> AP,ti) 
AP0 := lookup_answer(ií : CP); APi := A\ub(AP, AP0) 
if AP0 ^ APX t hen 
add (H : CP 1—> AP\) to answer table ; 
add_ever\t(updated(H : CP),ti) 
procedure ADD_DEPENDENT_RULES(A : CP, ti) 
for all are of the form Hk : CPQ =>• [CP-¡] Bki : CP2 m graph where there 
exists renaming a s.t. A : CP = (Bki : CP2)a do 
39: add_event(arc(iífc : CP0 => [CPi] Bk'A : CP2),ti) 
Handling Strategy which a particular instance of the generic algorithm may 
use. Events are of three forms: 
• newcall(v4 : CP) which indicates that a new cali pattern for literal A with 
description CP has been encountered. 
• arc(Hk : _ =>- [_] Bki : _) which indicates that the rule with Hk as head 
needs to be (re)computed from the position k, i. 
• updated(v4 : CP) which indicates that the answer description to cali pat-
tern A with description CP has been changed. 
The functions adcLevent and next_event respectively push an event to the 
priority queue and pop the event of highest priority, according to O. The 
algorithm is defined in terms of four abstract operations on the domain Da: 
• Arestrict(CP, V) performs the abstract restriction of a description CP to 
the set of variables in the set V, denoted vars(V); 
• Aextend(CP, V) extends the description CP to the variables in the set 
V; 
• Aconj(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract conjunction of two descriptions; 
• Alub(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract disjunction of two descriptions. 
More details on the algorithm can be found in [?,?]. Let us briefly explain 
its main procedures. The algorithm centers around the processing of events 
on the priority queue, which repeatedly removes the highest priority event 
(Line 4) and calis the appropriate event-handling function (L5-7). The 
function new_call_pattern initiates processing of all the rules for the defmition 
of the internal literal A, by adding are events for each of the first literals 
of these rules (L13). Initially, the answer for the cali pattern is set to ± 
(L14). The procedure process_arc performs the core of the analysis. It 
performs a single step of the left-to-right traversal of a rule body. If the 
literal Bk¿ is not a constraint (L16), the are is added to the dependeney are 
table (L17). Atoms are processed by function get_answer. Constraints are 
simply added to the current description (L25). In the case of literals, the 
function lookup_answer first looks up an answer for the given cali pattern in 
the answer table (L29) and if it is not found, it places a newcall event (L39). 
When it finds one, then this answer is extended to the variables in the rule 
the literal oceurs in (L26) and conjoined with the current description (L27). 
The resulting answer (L18) is either used to genérate a new are event to 
process the next literal in the rule, if Bki is not the last one (L19); otherwise, 
the new answer is computed by insert_answer_info. This is the part of the 
algorithm more relevant to the generation of reduced certificates. The new 
answer for the rule is combined with the current answer in the table (L33). 
If the fixpoint for such cali has not been reached, then the answer table 
entry is updated with the combined answer (L35) and an updated event 
is added to the queue (L36). The purpose of such an update is that the 
function add_dependent_rules (re)processes those calis which depend on the 
cali pattern A : CP whose answer has been updated (L38). This effect 
is achieved by adding the are events for each of its dependencies (L39). 
Note that dependeney ares are used for efficieney: they allow us to start 
the reprocessing of a rule from the body atom which actually needs to be 
recomputed due to an update rather than from scratch. 
3.2 Running Example 
Our running example is the program r e c t o y taken from [?]. We will use it 
to illustrate our algorithms and show that our approach improves state-of-
the-art techniques for reducing the size of certificates. In all our examples, 
abstract substitutions over a set of variables V, assign a regular type [?] 
to each variable in V. We use term as the most general type (i.e., term 
corresponds to all possible terms). For brevity, variables whose regular 
type is term are often not shown in abstract substitutions. Also, when it is 
clear from the context, an abstract substitution for an atom p(x\,... ,xn) 
is shown as a tupie (ti,... ,tn), such that each valué í¿ indicates the type of 
Xi. The most general substitution T assigns term to all variables in V. The 
least general substitution ± assigns the empty set of valúes to each variable. 
Example 3.1 Consider the Ciao versión of procedure r e c t o y [?] and the 
cali pattern rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , term) which indicates that external calis to 
r e c t o y are performed with an integer valué, i n t , in the first argument N. 
rectoy(N,M) : - N = 0, M = 0. 
rectoy(N,M) : - N l i s N - l , r ec toy (Nl ,R) , M i s Nl+R. 
We now briefly describe four main steps carried out in the analysis using 
some O G QHS (the detailed steps and analysis graph can be found in the 
technical report [?]): 
A. The initial event newcall(rectoy(N,M) : ( in t , term)) introduces the ares 
A\y\ and A2,\ in the queue, each one corresponds to the rules in the order 
above: 
Aiti = a rc( rec toy(N, M) : ( i n t , term) => [{N/int}] N = 0 : {N/int}) 
A2>i = a rc ( rec toy(N, M) : ( i n t , term) => [{N/int}] NI i s N - 1 : {N/int}) 
The initial answer E± rec toy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) i—• ± is inserted in the 
answer table. Label E\ is introduced for future reference. 
B. Assume that O assigns higher priority to A\y\. The next are is generated: 
Aí>2 = arc(rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , term) => [{N/int}] M = 0 : {M/term}) 
As it is the last atom in the body (L22), procedure insert_answer_info 
computes Alub(_L, {N/int , M/int}) and overwrites E\ with 
E[ rectoy(N, M) : ( in t , term) i—• ( in t , i n t ) 
Consequently, U\ : updated(rectoy(N, M) : ( in t , term)) is introduced in 
the queue. 
C. Now, O can choose between the processing of U\ or A2>\. Let us assume 
that A2>\ has higher priority. For its processing, we consider that prede-
fined functions "—", "+" and " i s " are dealt by the algorithm as standard 
constraints (see [?] for further details). Next, the are: 
^2,2 = arc(rectoy(N,M) : ( i n t , t e r m ) =>-
[{N/ in t ,Nl / in t} ] rectoy(Nl,R) : ( in t , term}) 
is introduced in the queue and the corresponding dependeney stored. By 
using the current answer E[, we get the are A2¿: 
A2fi = arc(rectoy(N, M) : ( i n t , term) =>-
[{N/int, N l / i n t , R / i n t } ] M i s NI + R : {Nl / i n t , R / in t} ) 
Clearly, the processing of A2)3 does not change the final answer E[. Henee, 
no more updates are introduced in the queue. 
D. Finally, we have to process the event U\ introduced in step B to which 
O has assigned lowest priority. The procedure add_dependent_rules finds 
the dependeney corresponding to are A2)2 and inserts an are for it in the 
queue. This relaunches an are identical to A2¿, which in turn launches 
an are identical to A2¿. However, the reprocessing does not change the 
fixpoint result E[ and analysis terminates. 
A fundamental issue here is that if we use some O' G QHS which assigns a 
priority to U\ higher than to A2)i, the whole reprocessing of A2)2 and A2¡3 in 
step D will not be performed. The reason is that the dependeney are table 
would be empty prior to processing A2¡2. Henee add_dependent_rules would 
not introduce any are. This corresponds to the notion of redundant update 
which we will introduce in Def. 4.1. • 
3.3 Full Certifícate 
The following definition corresponds to the essential idea in the ACC frame-
work -equations (1) and (2)- of using a static analyzer to genérate the cer-
tificates. The analyzer corresponds to Algorithm 1 and the certifícate is the 
full answer table. 
Definition 3.2 [full certifícate] We define function CERTIFIER_F:Prog x AD-
om xAAtom x AInt x QHS i—• ACert which takes P G Prog, Da G AD-
om, Sa G AAtom, Ia G AInt, O G QHS and returns as full certifícate, 
FCert G ACert, the answer table computed by ANALYZE_F(5'Q,, O) for P in 
Da iff FCert |Z Ia. 
Example 3.3 Consider the safety policy expressed by the following spec-
ification Ia : rectoy(N, M) : ( in t , term) i—• ( in t , r e a l ) . The certifier in 
Def. 3.2 returns as valid certifícate the single entry E[. Clearly E[ jZ Ia. D 
4 The Notion of Reduced Certifícate 
The key observation in order to reduce the size of certificates is that certain 
entries in a certifícate may be irrelevant, in the sense that the checker is 
able to reproduce them by itself in a single pass. The notion of relevance is 
directly related to the idea of recomputation in the program analysis graph. 
Intuitively, given an entry in the answer table A : CP i—• AP, its fixpoint 
may have been computed in several iterations from ±, AP0, AP\,... until 
AP. For each change in the answer, an updated event updated (^ 4 : CP) 
is generated during analysis. The above entry is relevant in a certifícate 
(under some strategy) when its updates forcé the recomputation of other 
ares in the graph which depend on A : CP (i.e., there is a dependeney from 
it in the table). Thus, unless A : CP i—• AP is included in the (reduced) 
certifícate, a single-pass checker which uses the same strategy as the code 
producer will not be able to validate the certifícate. 
According to the above intuition, we are interested in determining when 
an entry in the answer table has been "updated" during analysis and such 
changes affect other entries. However, there are two special types of updated 
events which can be considered "irrelevant". The first one is called redun-
dant update and corresponds to the kind of updates which forcé a redundant 
computation (like the event U\ generated in step B of Ex. 3.1). We write 
DAT\A:CP to denote the set of ares of the form H : CP0 => [CPi]B : CP2 
in the current dependeney are table such that they depend on A : CP, i.e., 
A : CP = (B : CP%)a, for some renaming o. 
Definition 4.1 [redundant update] Let P G Prog, Sa G AAtom and O G 
QHS. We say that an event updated (A : CP) which appears in the event 
queue during the analysis of P for Sa is redundant w.r.t. O iff, when it is 
generated, DAT\A-.CP = 0-
In the following section, we propose a slight modification to the analysis 
algorithm so that redundant updates are executed as soon as they appear, 
so that they never enforce redundant recomputation. Correctness of this 
modification can be found in the technical report [?]. 
Example 4.2 In our running example, U\ is redundant for O at the mo-
ment it is generated. However, since the event has been given low pri-
ority, its processing is delayed until the end and, in the meantime, a de-
pendeney from it has been added. This causes the unnecessary redundant 
re-computation of the second are for r e c t o y (A2>2)- n 
The second type of updates which can be considered irrelevant are initial 
updates which, under certain circumstances, are generated in the first pass 
over an are. In particular, we do not take into account updated events 
generated when the answer table contains ± for the updated entry. Note 
that this case still corresponds to the first traversal of any are and should 
not be considered as a reprocessing. 
Definition 4.3 [initial update] In the conditions of Def. 4.1, we say that 
an event updated (A : CP) which appears in the event queue during the 
analysis of P for Sa is initial for O if, when it is generated, the answer table 
contains A : CP i—• _L 
Initial updates do not occur in certain very optimized algorithms, like the 
one in [?]. However, they are necessary to model generic graph traversal 
strategies. In particular, they are intended to awake ares whose evaluation 
has been suspended. 
Example 4.4 Suppose that we use a strategy O" G QHS such that step 
C in Ex. 3.1 is performed before B (i.e., the second rule is analyzed before 
the first one). Then, when the answer for rectoy(Nl,R) : ( i n t , term} is 
looked up, procedure get_answer returns ± and thus the processing of are 
A2)2 is suspended at this point in the sense that its continuation A2)3 is not 
inserted in the queue (see L19 in Algorithm 1). Indeed, we can proceed with 
the remaining are A1;1 which is processed exactly as in step B. In this case, 
the updated event U\ is not redundant for O", as there is a dependency 
introduced by the former processing of are ^2,2 in the table. Therefore, the 
processing of U\ introduces the suspended are A2>2 again in the queue. The 
important point is that the fact that U\ inserts A2>2 must not be considered 
as a reprocessing, since A2¡2 had been suspended and its continuation (A2t3 
in this case) has not been handled by the algorithm yet. • 
Definition 4.5 [relevant update] In the conditions of Def. 4.1, we say that 
an event updated^ : CP) is relevant iff it is not initial ñor redundant. 
The key idea is that those answer patterns whose computation has intro-
duced relevant updates should be available in the certifícate. 
Definition 4.6 [relevant entry] In the conditions of Def. 4.1, we say that 
the entry A : CP 1—• AP in the answer table is relevant for O iff there has 
been at least one relevant event updated (A : CP) during the analysis of P 
for Sn 
'a.' 
The notion of reduced certifícate allows us to remove irrelevant enfries from 
the answer table and produce a smaller certifícate which can still be vali-
dated in one pass. 
Definition 4.7 [reduced certifícate] In the conditions of Def. 4.1, let FCert= 
ANALYZE_F(5'Q,, O) for P and Sa. We define the reduced certifícate, RCert, as 
the set of relevant enfries in FCert for O. 
Example 4.8 From now on, in our running example, we assume the strat-
egy O' G QHS which assigns the highest priority to redundant updates. 
For this strategy, the entry E[ rectoy(N,M) : ( in t , term) 1—• ( in t , i n t ) in 
Example 3.1 is not relevant as there has been no relevant updated event 
in the queue (U\ is redundant). Therefore, the reduced certifícate for our 
running example is empty. 2 • 
For function r e c t o y in Example 3.1, lightweight bytecode verification [?] 
sends, together with the program, the reduced non-empty certifícate cert = 
({30 i—• (e, rectoy • int • int • int • ± ) } , e), which states that in the program 
point 30, the stack does not contain information (first occurrence of e), 3 and 
variables N, M and R have type int, int and ± . The need of sending this 
information is because rec toy , implemented in Java, contains an if-branda 
(equivalent to the branching for selecting one of our two clauses for rectoy). 
And cert has to inform the checker that it is possible that in the point 30, 
variable R is undefined, if the if condition does not hold. Therefore, the 
above example shows that our approach improves on state-of-the-art PCC 
techniques by reducing the certifícate even further while still keeping the 
checking process one-pass. 
5 Generation of Certificates without Irrelevant En-
tries 
In this section, we proceed to instrument the analyzer of Algorithm 1 with 
the extensions necessary for producing reduced certificates, as defined in 
Def. 4.7. The resulting analyzer ANALYZE_R is presented in Algorithm 2. 
It uses the same procedures of Algorithm 1 except for the new definitions 
of add_dependent_rules and insert_answer_info. They differ from the original 
definitions in that: 
(i) We count the number of relevant updates for each cali pattern. To do 
this, we associate to each entry in the answer table a new field "w" 
whose purpose is to identify relevant entries. Concretely, u indicates 
the number of updated events processed for the entry. u is initialized 
when the (unique and first) initial updated event occurs for a cali 
pattern. The initialization of u is different for redundant and initial 
updates as explained in the next point. When the analysis finishes, 
if u > 1, we know that at least one reprocessing has occurred and 
the entry is thus relevant. The essential point to note is that u has 
to be increased when the event is actually extracted from the queue 
(L3) and not when it is introduced in it (L14). The reason for this is 
that when a non redundant updated event is introduced, if the priority 
queue contains an identical event, then the processing is performed 
only once. Therefore, our counter must not be increased. 
2
 It should be noted that, using SI as in Example 3.1, the answer is obtained by per-
forming two analysis iterations over the are associated to the second rule of rectoy(N,M) 
(steps C and D) due to the fact that U\ has been delayed and become relevant for SI. 
3
 The second occurrence of e indicates that there are no backwards jumps. 
(ii) We do not genérate redundant updates. Our algorithm does not intro-
duce redundant updated events (L14). However, if they are initial (and 
redundant), they have to be counted as if they had been introduced 
and processed and, thus, the next update over them has to be consid-
ered always relevant. This effect is achieved by initializing the u-valué 
with a higher valué ("1" in L12) than for initial updates ("0" in Ll l ) . 
Indeed, the valué "0" just indicates that the initial updated event has 
been introduced in the priority queue but not yet processed. It will 
be increased to "1" once it is extracted from the queue. Therefore, in 
both cases, the next updated event over the cali pattern will increase 
the counter to "2" and will be relevant. 
In Algorithm 2, a cali (u, AP)=get_from_answer_table(74 : CP) looks up in 
the answer table the entry for A : CP and returns its u-valué and its answer 
AP. A cali set_in_answer_table(74(ií) : CP i—• AP) replaces the entry for 
A : CP with the new one A(u) : CP i-> AP. 
Algorithm 2 ANALYZE_R: Analyzer instrumented for Certifícate Reduction 
1: procedure ADD_DEPENDENT_RULES(A : CP,Si) 
2: (AP,u) =get_from_answer_table(A : CP) 
3: set_in_answer_table(A(M + 1) : CP i-> AP) 
4: for all are of the form H^ : CPQ =>• [CP-¡] B¡.i : CP2 in graph where there 
exists renaming a s.t. A : CP = (Bk¿ '• CP2)cr do 
5: add_event(arc(iífc : CP0 => [CPi] B¿A : CP2),Si) 
6: procedure INSERT_ANSWER_INFO(ÍÍ : CP i-> AP,Si) 
7: AP0 := lookup_answer(ií : CP, Si) 
8: APi := A\ub(AP, AP0) 
9: if AP0 ^ APi t hen 
10: if AP0 = ± t hen % initial update 
11: if DAT\ 
H-.CP 7^  0 t hen u = 0 
12: else u = 1 
13: else (u, _)=get_from_answer_table(ií : CP) % not initial update 
14: if DAT\H:CP ^ 0 then add.event(updated(ií : CP)) 
15: set_in_answer_table(ií(M) : CP ^ APi) 
Example 5.1 Consider the four steps performed in the analysis of our run-
ning example. Step A is identical. In step B, the procedure insert_answer_info 
deteets an initial and redundant updated event (L12) and initializes the u-
value of E[ to 1. No updated event is generated (L14). Step C remains 
identical and step D does not oceur. As expected, upon return, the valué 
of u for E[ is 1. • 
Proposition 5.2 Let P E Prog, Da e ADom, Sa E AAtom, O E QHS. 
Let FCert be the answer table computed by ANALYZE_R(/5'Q,, Q) for P in Da. 
Then, an entry A(u) : CPA ^ AP E FCert is relevant iffu> 1. 
Note that, except for the control of relevant entries, ANALYZE_F(5'Q,, O) and 
ANALYZE_R(5'Q,, O) have the same behaviour and they compute the same an-
swer table (see our technical report [?]). We use function removeJrrelevant-
_answers which takes a set of answers of the form A(u) : CP i—• AP G FCert 
and returns, in RCert, the set of answers A : CP i—• AP such that u > 1. 
Definition 5.3 We define the function CERTIFIER_R: Prog x ADom x AA-
tom x .4/ní x QHS i—• v4Cerí, which takes P G Prog, P>a G ^4P 0777-, ¿ a G 
AAtom, Ia G v4/ní, O G QHS, and returns as certifícate, RCert=remove_irre-
levant_answers(FCert) iff FCert |Z / a , where FCert=ANALYZE_R(5'Q,, O). 
6 Discussion 
In this paper we have proposed an extensión of the ACC framework which 
generates (and checks) reduced certificates by eliminating from certificates 
the information which the checker can reproduce in a single pass. This 
allows reducing transmission and storage costs for certificates without in-
creasing checking time. 
6.1 Some Issues on Checking Reduced Certificates 
In the ACC framework for full certificates, the checking algorithm [?] uses 
a specific graph traversal strategy Qc- This checker has been shown to be 
very eflicient but in turn its design is not generic with respect to this issue 
(in contrast to the analysis design).4 This is not problematic in the con-
text of full certificates as, even if the certifier uses a strategy O^ different 
from Qc, it is ensured that all valid certificates get validated in one pass 
by such specific checker. This result does not hold anymore in the case of 
reduced certificates. In particular, completeness of checking is not guaran-
teed if QA ^ Qc- This occurs because though the answer table is identical 
for all strategies, the subset of redundant entries depends on the particular 
strategy used. The problem is that, if there is an entry A : CP i—• AP in 
FCert such that it is relevant w.r.t. Qc but it is not w.r.t. QA, then a single 
pass checker will fail to validate the RCert generated using Q^. Therefore, 
it is essential in this context to design generic checkers which are not tied 
to a particular graph traversal strategy. Upon agreeing on the appropri-
ate parameters 5 , the consumer uses the particular instance of the generic 
checker resulting from application of such parameters. In our technical re-
port [?], we design a checker for reduced certificates which is corred, i.e., if 
the checker succeeds in validating the certifícate, then the certifícate is valid 
4
 Note that both the analysis and checking algorithms are always parametric on the 
abstract domain, with the resulting genericity, which allows proving a wide variety of 
properties by using the large set of available domains, being one of the fundamental 
advantages of ACC. 
5
 In a particular application of our framework, we expect that the graph traversal strat-
egy is agreed a priori between consumer and producer. But, if necessary, (e.g., the 
consumer does not implement this strategy), it could be sent along with the transmitted 
package. 
for the program, no matter what the graph traversal strategy used is. We 
also provide sufficient conditions for ensuring completeness of the checking 
process. Concretely, if the checker uses the same strategy as the analyzer 
then our proposed checker will succeed in validating any reduced certifícate 
which is valid. 
6.2 On the Experimental Evaluation 
As we have illustrated throughout the paper, the reduction achieved is di-
rectly related to the amount of updates (or iterations) performed during 
analysis. Clearly, depending on the graph traversal strategy used, different 
instances of the generic analyzer will genérate reduced certificates of differ-
ent sizes. Important efforts have been made during the last years in order 
to improve the efliciency of analysis. The most optimized analyzers aim at 
reducing the number of updates necessary to reach the final fixpoint [?]. 
Interestingly, our framework greatly benefits from all these advances, since 
the more efficient analysis is, the smaller the corresponding reduced certifi-
cates are. We have implemented the generator of reduced certificates as an 
extensión of the efficient, highly optimized, state-of-the-art analysis system 
available in CiaoPP and which is part of a working compiler. Both, the 
analysis and checker use the optimized depth-first new-calling QHS of [?]. 
We are now in the process of experimentally evaluating our approach. Pre-
liminary results are very encouraging. They show reductions in certifícate 
size of around 70% on average (see [?]). 
6.3 Future Work 
We plan to assess the influence that different strategies have on certifícate 
reduction. Also, we will consider and compare with the case of using the 
fixed-point analyzers also on the checking side. In this case, since the cer-
tifícate can be recreated at the receiving end as much as needed, there is 
clearly a wide range of trade-offs between the size of the certifícate and the 
checking time. We also want to investigate ways of reducing the trusted base 
code (see, e.g., [?,?]) in ACC. Additionally, we are studying the application 
of incremental analysis algorithms in order to reduce both certifícate size 
and checking time in the context of modifications to a program for which a 
certifícate has already been checked at the consumer side [?]. 
